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SHOULD USING FACEBOOK AT WORK BE A FEDERAL CRIME?:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT APPLIES HONEST SERVICES
FRAUD TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN
UNITED STATES v. MCGEEHAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Kevin works in the accounting department at Dunder Mifflin, Inc. 1
The Dunder Mifflin employee handbook prohibits the use of company
computers for personal email or social networking websites.2 Kevin un-
derstands this policy, but nonetheless keeps his Facebook webpage open
while working so he can keep in touch with his friends.3 He estimates that
he is only occasionally distracted and spends at most one hour each day
checking his friends' profiles and sending them messages.4 Is Kevin guilty
of a federal crime?5
1. The character and company names used in this hypothetical are derived
from the National Broadcasting Channel (NBC) primetime television show "The
Office." For more information about the premise of and characters on "The Of-
fice," see http://www.nbc.com/TheOffice/ (last visited November 29, 2010). For
more information about Dunder Miffin, the fictitious paper company profiled on
"The Office" and used in this hypothetical, see Dunder Mifflin, http://www.
dundermifflin.com/ (last visited November 29, 2010).
2. For an example of actual employee handbook policy provisions regarding
internet usage, see Susan M. Heathfield, Internet and Email Policy, ABoUT.COM,
http://humanresources.about.com/od/policiesandsamplesl/a/email policy.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (authorizing employees' internet usage for conducting
company business only). For a fictitious argument supporting the use of social
networking sites during work hours as articulated by a character from "The Of-
fice," see Michael Scott, Scott's Shots, DUNDER MIFFLIN, INC.: SCRANTON NEWSLETTER
(Scranton, PA.), Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.dundermifflin.com/news
letter/scranton/scranton_012110.shtml (advocating for employees to actually use
social networking websites by stating: "People, it's time to get with the 2010's, this
is not your momma's social networking site (although it is my mom's) . . . everyone
is doing it.").
3. See Sharon Gaudin, Study: 54 Percent of Companies Ban Facebook, Twitter at
Work, WIRED (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/10/study-54-
of-companies-ban-facebook-twitter-at-work/ (finding that social networking web-
sites divert employee attention away from more pressing priorities).
4. See id. (finding that studies show some employees use social networking
websites as much as two hours per work day).
5. See, e.g., Frank C. Razzano & Kristin H. Jones, Prosecution of Private Corporate
Conduct, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2009, available at http://www.abanet.org/bus
law/blt/2009-01-02/razzano.shtml (finding several line-drawing issues in prosecut-
ing private individuals). Razzano and Jones ask: "How can we know when a lack of
absolute honesty and candor will result in prosecution?" Id. (stating that all dis-
honesty, lack of candor, or fundamental fairness is captured by statute). Further-
more, Razzano and Jones give several hypothetical situations that could fall under
the statute:
An employer's employee manual prohibits personal calls. Does an em-
ployee who in violation of this workplace rule calls her sitter to check on
(1007)
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Following the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. McGeehan,6
Kevin has committed "honest services fraud."7 The honest services fraud
statute (18 U.S.C. § 1346) criminalizes an individual's use of the mails or
wires in a manner that "deprive [s] another of the intangible right of hon-
est services."8 According to Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, Sec-
tion 1346 potentially criminalizes the conduct of "100 million workers in
her children become a federal felon? Does an associate at a law firm who
writes a complaint letter on firm stationary to a retailer who has sold him
shoddy merchandise without approval from a partner commit a crime
where use of firm letterhead is generally restricted to firm business? How
about the partner who treats the general counsel of a prospective client
to a Super Bowl weekend in the hope that the next big case will come his
way? Is a salesperson who, without advising the customer of the known
difficulties in programming the unit, sells a customer a sophisticated mul-
timedia sound system in order to earn a large commission a potential
candidate for the big house? All of these scenarios involve some form of
deception and, if the mails and wires are used in the execution of these
seemly common examples, they could potentially be the predicate acts
for a federal crime.
Id. (identifying examples of conduct that could in fact lead to prosecution and
conviction).
6. 584 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2009).
7. See id. (finding private individual guilty of honest services fraud). For a
further discussion of the Kevin hypothetical, see infra notes 143-89 and accompa-
nying text.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). Section 1346 defines "scheme or artifice to
defraud" which is contained in both the mail and wire fraud statutes. See id.§§ 1341, 1343 (defining scheme or artifice to defraud). The mail fraud statute
reads, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to
be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be depos-
ited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or
commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such car-
rier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is di-
rected to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.
Id. § 1341 (emphasis added). The wire fraud statute reads, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in inter-
state or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Id. § 1343 (emphasis added).
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the United States."9 And Kevin, under either of the two standards articu-
lated by the Third Circuit in McGeehan, would be a criminal under the
statute.' 0
The Supreme Court, however, recently reined in the circuit courts'
interpretation of the honest services fraud statute in Skilling v. United
States." Specifically, the Court concluded that the statute's limited scope
renders it applicable only to cases involving "bribes and kickbacks."1 2 To
this end, defendants accused of violating Section 1346 must receive some
benefit from their conduct; it is not enough that harm was inflicted
through the breach of a fiduciary duty.1 3 Accordingly, Kevin has not com-
mitted honest services fraud under the Supreme Court's authoritative in-
terpretation of the statute.
In recent decades, Congress and the federal courts have struggled to
define the contours of honest services fraud.' 4 The Supreme Court first
held that the mail and wire fraud statutes did not cover intangible rights,
such as the right to honest services, in McNally v. United States.' 5 Immedi-
ately thereafter, Congress enacted Section 1346 to reenact the pre-McNally
case law and effectively overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statute.' 6 In its recent Skilling opinion, the Court recognized that the leg-
islature might again react to its narrow interpretation of the honest ser-
vices fraud statute and, in anticipation of such action, challenged
Congress to "speak more clearly than it has."17 Indeed, there is a signifi-
cant possibility that Congress will enact one of two competing approaches
adopted by the circuit courts to supersede the Skilling standard.1 8
Notably, the Third Circuit considered both of these approaches in
McGeehan, and, while not explicitly adopting one over the other, articu-
lated a helpful interpretation of both standards with respect to the stat-
9. See Gary S. Chafetz, The Final Days of Honest-Services Fraud, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-s-chafetz/the-final-days-of-
honest_b_387403.html (discussing Justice Breyer's comments during oral argu-
ment in recent honest services fraud case).
10. For a further discussion of the Kevin hypothetical, see infra notes 143-89
and accompanying text.
11. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010) (disagreeing
with Fifth Circuit's construction of Section 1346).
12. Id. (holding that "honest-services fraud does not encompass conduct
more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks").
13. See id.
14. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's honest services fraud jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 86-124 and accompanying text.
15. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352 (1987).
16. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988) (codified as 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
17. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933 (calling for congressional clarity as to Section
1346).
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ute's applicability to the conduct of private individuals.' 9 In fact,
Congress is now considering a bill to restore honest services fraud to its
pre-Skilling status. 20
This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit's interpretation of honest
services fraud in the private sector and serves as a guide to prosecutors
bringing, or counsel defending against, actions before the court in the
future.2 ' Part II explains the early developments of the honest services
doctrine, the enactment of Section 1346, and the case law developments
since Section 1346's enactment.2 2 Part III discusses the Third Circuit's
application of the honest services law in McGeehan and offers a critical
analysis of the case.23 Part IV briefly discusses the Skilling opinion, its im-
pact on honest services fraud, and foreshadows Congress's reaction. 24
Part V provides suggestions-relevant now and in the future-for practi-
tioners in the Third Circuit.2 5 Finally, Part VI concludes by emphasizing
the importance of McGeehan and its future impact in the Third Circuit.2 6
II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Developments of Honest Services Fraud Before
the Enactment of Section 1346
1. The First Mail Fraud Statute and the Development of the Intangible Rights
Doctrine
Much of the current controversy surrounding honest services fraud
arises from the history of the intangible rights doctrine and honest ser-
vices fraud as it existed before the enactment of Section 1346.27 The first
mail fraud statute enacted in 1872 contained broad language making it
19. See United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2009) (considering
for first time Section 1346 as applied to private conduct).
20. See Samuel Rubenfeld, Leahy Introduces Bill to Expand 'Honest-Services' Stat-
ute, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/
09 /28/sen-leahy-introduces-bill-to-restore-honest-services-replacemen t/ (discuss-
ing possible congressional reform efforts).
21. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the honest services doc-
trine, see infra notes 86-124 and accompanying text. For suggestions to practition-
ers bringing or defending similar cases before the court, see infra notes 141-89 and
accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the honest services doctrine's background, see infra
notes 27-90 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of McGeehan, see infra notes 91-124 and accompanying
text.
24. For a discussion of Skilling and future implications of the ruling, see infra
notes 130-38.
25. For tips and suggestions for practitioners, see infra notes 141-89 and ac-
companying text.
26. For an assessment of McGeehan's potential impact, see infra notes 190-94
and accompanying text.
27. See generally Alice Anne Stephens, Note, The Evolution of the Harm Require-
ment in Honest Services Fraud, 36 Am. J. CRuM. L. 71, 74 (2008) (discussing relevance
of intangible rights doctrine).
1010 [Vol. 55: p. 1007
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illegal to use the mails in connection with "any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud."28 The Supreme Court addressed the scope of this statute in Dur-
land v. United States2 9 and interpreted the phrase "scheme or artifice to
defraud" broadly by holding that it includes offenses of an "extraordinarily
wide range of deceptive conduct."30 In 1909, Congress codified its intent
more precisely by adding to the statute that actions directed at "obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises" were likewise illegal.3 1
In the years following these enactments, the federal courts of appeals
expanded their interpretation of the scope of the mail fraud statute be-
yond just those instances where the victim was defrauded of tangible assets
to the criminalization of schemes aimed at depriving victims of their intan-
gible rights as well, including the right to honest services.3 2 At first, the
intangible rights doctrine developed primarily in the public sector.
3 3
Prosecutors typically used the mail fraud statute to prosecute either brib-
ery of a public official or the failure of a public official to disclose informa-
tion regarding a personal interest potentially affecting his or her
judgment.34 Biased decision-making or misuse of power for personal gain
constituted a deprivation of honest services regardless of the tangible
28. See Michael K. Avery, Note, Whose Rights? Why States Should Set Parameters
for Federal Honest Services Mail and Fraud Prosecutions, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1431 (2008)
(stating that original legislative history indicates Congress intended to protect citi-
zens from deprivation of only tangible assets such as money or property); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (containing remarks by bill's sponsor,
Rep. Farnsworth, that law was needed to prevent fraud by "thieves, forgers, and
rapscallions generally").
29. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
30. See id. at 313-14 (arguing that phrase encompassed "everything designed
to defraud by representations as to past or present, or suggestions and promises as
to the future").
31. SeeAct of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (adding several sections
to original mail fraud statute).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148,1153 (3d Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that mail fraud statute protects voter's right to fair elections); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that indictment under mail
fraud statute does state offense even where it does not contain allegations that
anyone was defrauded of money or property).
33. See, e.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding
that scheme involving corruption of public official is fraud), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Classic, 35 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. La. 1940) (holding that "scheme to defraud" in-
cludes deprivation of intangible right of good government when election commis-
sioner committed fraud); see alsoJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of
the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J.
1875, 1879 (1992) (listing cases where intangible rights doctrine developed in pub-
lic sector).
34. See Nirav Shah, Mail and Wire Fraud, 40 AM. CiuM. L. REv. 825, 834 (2003)
(finding that intangible rights doctrine was used only to prosecute bribery or con-
flict of interest cases).
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harm to the public. 3 5 In the private sector, these intangible rights in-
cluded an employer's right to the honest services of its employees.3 6
Moreover, an employer's intangible rights also encompassed rights uncon-
nected to any specific duty where the victim suffered no actual economic
loss, such as the right to privacy and the right to "time, effort, money, and
expectations."3 7
2. The Addition of Wire Fraud
In 1952, Congress broadened the coverage of federal fraud protec-
tions by enacting the wire fraud statute.3 8 The statute criminalizes the
transmission of writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds by means of
wire, radio, or television in interstate commerce-including Kevin's
Facebook usage in the aforementioned hypothetical.3 9 Although there is
little legislative history, courts have construed the statute much in the
same vein as the mail fraud statute. 40 Thus, the wire fraud statute has
been interpreted, like the mail fraud statute, to protect intangible rights
such as the right to honest services.4 1
In both the private and public sectors, courts continued to use the
intangible rights doctrine to criminalize behavior; however, the focus
shifted from protecting the integrity of the mails to punishing white-collar
criminals. 4 2 According to one commentator, this "exotic flower . . .
quickly overgrew the legal landscape in the manner of the kudzu vine un-
til . . . few ethical or fiduciary breaches seemed beyond its potential
35. See Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REv. 223, 233(1992) ("Prosecutors indicted and convicted public officials pursuant to the intan-
gible rights doctrine with a finding that they had deprived the citizenry of the right
to good government.").
36. See, e.g., United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying
intangible rights doctrine to private sector); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777(2d Cir. 1985) (maintaining that intangible rights doctrine protected private
relationships).
37. SeeJohn E. Gagliardi, Back to the Future: Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Under
18 U.S.C. 1346, 68 WASH. L. REv. 901, 907 (1993) (internal citations omitted) (dis-
cussing application of intangible rights doctrine to various private relationships).
38. See Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 18(a), 66 Stat. 722 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006)) (criminalizing "fraud by wire, radio or television").
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (defining wire fraud).
40. SeeAvery, supra note 28, at 1436 (finding statute to be patterned closely on
mail fraud statute).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d. 1383, 1387-88 (9th Cir.
1978) (applying honest services element to mail fraud); United States v. Donahue,
539 F.2d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying honest services element to wire
fraud).
42. See Carrie A. Tendler, Note, An Indictment of Bright Line Tests for Honest
Services Mail Fraud, 72 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2729, 2734-35 (2004) (discussing use of
honest services fraud to combat modem white-collar criminals).
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reach."4 3 The statute became an increasingly strategic tool to fight politi-
cal corruption and economic misconduct.44
3. Limiting the Reach of the Statutes: McNally v. United States
Courts continued to enforce citizens' right to honest services until the
Supreme Court's 1987 decision in McNally v. United States.45 In McNally,
both private citizens and state officials of Kentucky had been convicted of
mail fraud under Section 1341 for their participation in a self-dealing pa-
tronage scheme in which they used the mails to defraud the state of Ken-
tucky of its intangible right to have its affairs conducted honestly.4 6
The Court, however, reversed the convictions and held that both Sec-
tions 1341 and 1343 were limited to the protection of property rights and,
therefore, did not cover intangible rights such as the right to honest ser-
vices.4 7 The Court relied upon the legislative history of the original mail
fraud statute and noted that the statute reached only false promises and
misrepresentations involving money or property.4 8 Nonetheless, the
Court did invite Congress to speak more clearly regarding whether Sec-
tions 1341 and 1343 provided the right to honest services.4 9
The McNally Court, in reversing more than two decades of the circuit
courts' intangible rights doctrine precedent, emphasized two concerns-
notice and federalism.5 0 First, the Court explained that when there are
"two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we
43. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/
Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 427, 427 (1998) (advocating against ex-
panding reach of honest services fraud).
44. See PeterJ. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Chang-
ing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REv. 435, 438 (1995) (listing several
cases in which prosecutors used honest services fraud).
45. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 352 (1987), superseded by statute,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988); United States v. George,
477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that, in private context, government
need not show that victim of scheme was actually defrauded or suffered loss to
obtain honest services conviction); United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380, 384-85
(E.D. La. 1969) (holding that government need not be defrauded of tangible as-
sets such as money or property to successfully prosecute honest services fraud
claim).
46. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 352 (finding that state officials instructed com-
pany acting as Kentucky's workers' compensation agent to funnel commission
checks to companies owned by official and other defendants in exchange for con-
tinual relationship with state).
47. See id. at 359-60 (reversing district court). In rejecting the intangible
rights doctrine, the McNally Court held that "the mail fraud statute clearly protects
property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good
government." Id. (reversing appellate court interpretation of statute).
48. See id. at 358-59 (noting that if Court were to construe Sections 1341 and
1343 to include honest services fraud, statute would remain ambiguous and federal
government could thus become involved in impermissibly setting standards of
good government for state and local officials).
49. See id. at 360 (inviting Congress directly to "speak more clearly").
50. See id. (stating that two primary concerns influenced decision).
2010] CASEBRIEF 1013
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are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and
definite language."51 Second, the Court expressed concern that the fed-
eral government was intruding on state enforcement of misconduct by
state officials and thus violating the fundamental principles of
federalism.5 2
4. Congress Responds to the Supreme Court
In direct response to the McNally decision, Congress, in 1988, enacted
Section 1346.53 This Section explicitly defines the intangible right of hon-
est services as encompassed within the scope of Sections 1341 and 1343.54
Therefore, a prosecutor pursuing a mail fraud charge could do so in con-
junction with a traditional deprivation of property or money allegation or,
alternatively, could proceed under a theory of the intangible right to hon-
est services.5 5 Senator Biden, in the legislative history of Section 1346,
specifically stated that the congressional intent of the statute was to rein-
state the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the scope of the mail and wire
fraud statutes.56
B. Development of Case Law Since the Enactment of the Honest Services
Fraud Law: A Split Among the Federal Circuits
Most circuits have considered the scope of Section 1346 in the private
sector and agree on a need for its limits; however, there is little agreement
on what these limits should be.5 7 In interpreting Section 1346, courts
51. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 359-60 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
347 (1971)) (arguing for rule of lenity and notice).
52. See id. at 360 (finding that intangible rights doctrine "involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and
state officials").
53. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (indicating that, for purposes of mail and wire fraud,
"the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services").
55. See Stephens, supra note 27, at 80 (discussing applications to both public
and private fiduciaries).
56. See 134 CONG. REc. S17, 360-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden). Senator
Biden remarked specifically that, under the amendment, Sections 1341 and 1343
will protect any person's intangible right to the honest services of another, includ-
ing the right of the public to the honest services of public officials. See id. Biden
also remarked that the intent of the amendment was to reinstate all of the pre-
McNally case law pertaining to the mail and wire fraud statutes, without change.
See id. (discussing statute's purpose). Biden stated that the statute now makes
clear that "it is a crime to deprive any organization-such as a corporation or a
labor union-of the loyal services of its employees." Id. (encouraging Congress to
adopt statute to restore pre-McNally case precedent).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(adopting materiality test); United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2002)(adopting reasonably foreseeable harm test with de minimis harm requirement);
United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002) (drawing distinction be-
tween duty enforceable in tort and duty enforceable in contract); United States v.
1014 [Vol. 55: p. 1007
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have expressed the same concerns as those reflected in pre-McNally case
law-notice and federalism.5 8 Lingering concerns with notice to public fi-
duciaries were resolved by Congress's concrete enactment after McNally."
Questions surrounding fair notice to private fiduciaries, however, still
plague the courts.6 0 Thus, courts remain vigilant as to the notice problem
in the realm of private behavior because a wide range of conduct could
unknowingly fall under the statute.6 ' Further, concerns about the over-fed-
eralization of law and the intrusion on state criminal enforcement exist in
the application of Section 1346 because the federal government is inter-
vening in traditional areas of state control-the regulation of business re-
lationships and the imposition of criminal punishment.62
The circuits have split regarding the requirements of honest services
fraud in prosecuting private fiduciaries. 6 3 The dominant standard among
the circuits, including the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits, is that the breach of fiduciary duty must cause harm
Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 327-29 (4th Cir. 2001) (adopting reasonably foreseeable
harm test), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002); United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 2000) (adopting reasonably foreseeable harm test); United States v. Sun-
Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (adopting reason-
ably foreseeable harm test); United States v.Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1997)
(requiring government to prove some articulable harm to victim or some intended
gain to defendant).
58. See Stephens, supra note 27, at 77 (discussing courts' concerns with
statute).
59. See United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 365 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that
"the right of the public to the honest services of its official derives at least in part
from the concept that corruption and the denigration of the common good vio-
lates 'the essence of the political contract'").
60. See Stephens, supra note 27, at 77 (finding that statute has no precise in-
struction for private conduct).
61. See Frost, 125 F.3d at 365 (explaining that concern with notice to public
fiduciaries has always been somewhat mitigated by democratic assumption of ac-
countability, whereas this does not exist in private sector). Furthermore, the court
quoted one commentator who stated:
This refusal to carry out the intangible rights doctrine to its logical ex-
treme stems from a need to avoid the over-criminalization of private rela-
tionships: "If merely depriving the victim of the loyalty and faithful
service of his fiduciary constitutes mail fraud, then the ends/means dis-
tinction is lost. Once the ends/means distinction is abolished and disloy-
alty becomes a crime, little remains before every civil wrong is potentially
indictable."
Id. (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminaliza-
tion ofFiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. CluM.
L. REv. 117, 167 (1981)).
62. There are also counterarguments touting the efficacy and political neu-
trality of federal prosecution of local public officials; however, it is beyond the
scope of this Casebrief to discuss more specific federalism implications of Section
1346. See generally George D. Brown, New Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who
Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 417 (2003); George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-Mail Fraud,
State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 225 (1997).
63. See Stephens, supra note 27, at 87 (listing circuit splits).
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that is reasonably foreseeable.64 However, the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits have adopted a materiality standard. 65 The Third Circuit uses both
standards in analyzing honest services fraud as applied to private
fiduciaries. 66
1. The Foreseeable Harm Standard
The foreseeable harm standard requires that the defendant intention-
ally breached some fiduciary duty and "foresaw or reasonably should have
foreseen" that the breach would cause economic harm to his victim.67
The D.C. Circuit was the first circuit to adopt a foreseeable harm test in
the 1983 case United States v. Lemire.6 8 In Lemire, the court, concerned with
the government's "expansive interpretation in this and other recent mail
and wire fraud cases," expressed "second thoughts" about the need to de-
fine the fraud.69 Namely, "with the broadening of the scope of the statute
to cover intangible harms" the court found a "certain amount of confusion
and controversy over the outer boundaries of wire fraud."7 0 Thus, the
court perceived a need to limit the broad reach of honest services fraud as
it pertains to private conduct.7 1
64. See generally United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating
that harm must be reasonably foreseeable); United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2000) (adopting foreseeable harm standard); United States v. Devegter, 198
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) (questioning the foreseeable harm standard but none-
theless adopting it); Frost, 125 F.3d at 346 (advocating for foreseeable harm stan-
dard); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that best
standard for evaluating honest services fraud is foreseeable harm standard).
65. See generally United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopt-
ing materiality standard); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 146 (2d Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (creating materiality standard); United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660
(10th Cir. 1997) (finding materiality standard appropriate).
66. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's use of these standards, see
infra notes 102-124 and accompanying text.
67. See Vinyard, 266 F.3d at 320 (adopting foreseeable harm standard).
68. See Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1334-39 (discussing foreseeable harm standard). In
Lemire, the defendant was an employee of Raytheon Corporation and was in charge
of delivering housing as part of Raytheon's contract with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. See id. at 1332 (explaining agreement to provide housing for construction
of missile base). The defendant, however, bypassed Raytheon's contract by inde-
pendently agreeing to broker a deal through a separate shipping company and
thus caused Raytheon to be overcharged in shipping costs. See id. (stating that
government argued Raytheon was overcharged because submitted bid was based
on information from Lemire that contract would be awarded to IMS). This al-
lowed Interconex to calculate the shipping charges based on being able to charterjust one ship rather than send housing piecemeal. See id. (discussing scheme al-
lowing for excess profits, which were then distributed in kickbacks to defendants
through Generation Holding).
69. Id. at 1335 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. at 1336 (expressing concerns with applying Section 1346 to private
conduct).
71. See Stephens, supra note 27, at 87 (discussing foreseeable harm standard
created by D.C. Circuit as applied to private conduct).
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Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that an intentional failure to dis-
close a conflict of interest is not alone sufficient evidence of the intent
needed to defraud an employer under the wire fraud statute.72 Instead,
the court required showing of a conflict of interest with the employer that
carries "a significant risk of identifiable harm to the employer apart from
the loss of his employee's loyalty and fidelity."73 Furthermore, the harm
must be such that "the defendant might reasonably have contemplated
some concrete business harm to his employer."74
Following the D.C. Circuit, the Sixth Circuit adopted a version of the
reasonably foreseeable harm standard in United States v. Frost.7 5 There, the
court rejected the defendant's contention that Section 1346 only applied
to public fiduciaries, and required the prosecution to prove that the de-
fendant intended to breach a fiduciary duty and "foresaw or reasonably
should have foreseen that his employer might suffer an economic harm as
a result of the breach."7 6
Other circuit courts, including the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, have followed the D.C. and Sixth Circuits' lead by adopting substan-
tially similar standards.7 7 Among these circuits, the D.C. Circuit has
72. See Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1337 (maintaining public/private distinction, spe-
cifically stating that this standard did not apply to public officials, only private
fiduciaries).
73. Id. (stressing that harm must be significant).
74. Id. (distinguishing foreseeable harm standard from older materiality stan-
dard, assuming that by requiring foreseeable harm, harm must be material be-
cause business context demands that it concern financial bottom line). The D.C.
Circuit later reaffirmed Lemire in United States v. Sun Diamond Growers of California.
See 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff'd 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (upholding foreseeable
harm standard). The case concerned whether campaign contributions were given
to Henry Espy, the brother of Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy. See id. (confirm-
ing that foreseeable harm standard is appropriate test). Henry Espy ran an unsuc-
cessful campaign for Congress and acquired substantial debt in the process. See id.
at 969 (explaining that Espy asked Sun Diamond's lobbyist, Douglas, for help with
his brother's campaign debt). Douglas solicited the contributions and then billed
Sun Diamond for the cost of the contributions and falsely listed them as tickets to a
dinner in Washington. See id. (questioning whether this action by private fiduciary
falls under honest services prong of Section 1346 and adhering to its interpreta-
tion of honest services fraud in private context, holding that defendant need not
have intended harm, but rather "might reasonably have contemplated" some eco-
nomic harm to his employer).
75. 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997). Frost, a professor at the University of Texas
Space Institute and the owner of a company that provided atmospheric science
research, instructed his students who were NASA or Army employees to secure
contracts for his company. See id. at 352-53. In return, the defendant would aid
the students in preparing for their masters or doctoral thesis by giving them access
to internal documents at his company. See id. (discussing illegal kickback scheme).
76. See id. at 368 (rejecting defendant's contention that Section 1346 only
applies to public fiduciaries, although noting that honest services theory applica-
tion is more problematic in private sector where relationships are founded more
on economic benefit and less on common good).
77. For a further discussion of the jurisprudence in these circuits, see Ste-
phens, supra note 27, at 90-92.
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defined the least demanding standard because of the "might reasonably
have contemplated" language renders convictions more attainable in its
jurisdiction.7 8 By contrast, the standard of the Sixth Circuit, which is
largely followed by the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, is more strin-
gent and requires that the defendant "foresaw or reasonably should have
foreseen that his employer might suffer an economic harm as a result of
the breach."7 9 In all of the circuits, however, the requirement of harm
continues to puzzle and perplex those who try to determine the exact
quantifiers by which the harm is to be judged.8 0
2. The Materiality Standard
The materiality standard requires that the defendant possessed fraud-
ulent intent and made "any misrepresentation that has the natural ten-
dency to influence or is capable of influencing the victim to change his
behavior."8 1 The Second Circuit, in United States v. Rybicki, authored the
most important opinion involving the materiality standard.82 The Rybicki
court stressed that the materiality requirement is only met when the em-
ployee's misinformation or omission would "naturally tend to lead or is
capable of leading a reasonable employer to change its conduct."8 3 Fur-
ther, the court maintained that actual harm or pecuniary harm was not a
necessary element that the prosecution must establish. 84 This standard
has been followed by the Tenth and Fifth Circuits.8 5
78. See Sun Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d at 974 (discussing more
relaxed "might reasonably have contemplated" approach).
79. See Frost, 125 F.3d at 368 (adopting more stringent standard).
80. For a further discussion of approaches to argue before the court, see infra
notes 141-89 and accompanying text.
81. See United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) (adopting mate-
riality standard).
82. See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc). The
defendants in Rybicki were employees of a personal injury law firm who secretly
paid off the insurance adjusters in the cases they covered. See id. at 127 (discussing
scheme in which lawyers would pay adjusters tips). Neither the lawyers nor the
claim adjusters reported the payments to their employers. See id. (discussing facts
of case). The court concluded that the defendants' actions violated the honest
services doctrine because they had acted in their own interest which led to a mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission of information disclosed. See id. (finding fault
under material misrepresentation standard).
83. Id. at 145 (finding employer relies on its employees' conduct).
84. See id. (finding materiality test most accurate because it was based on all
elements common to entire body of law). Furthermore, the standard encapsulates
all economic harm that would cause the employer to change its behavior, and thus
all behavior that would fall under the reasonably foreseeable standard. See id.
(adopting materiality test over foreseeable harm test).
85. See United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting
materiality test); United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
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3. Third Circuit Jurisprudence Pertaining to Honest Services Fraud
Prior to McGeehan, the Third Circuit considered only three principal
honest services fraud cases in the post-McNally time period.8 6 These cases
are United States v. Antico, United States v. Panarella, and United States v. Mur-
phy.87 Yet, the honest services at issue in these cases were allegedly owed
86. See United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 2009) (discuss-
ing materiality and foreseeable harm standards).
87. See United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Panarella, 277 F.3d 678 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245 (3d
Cir. 2001). In Antico, the defendant was an official for the Philadelphia Depart-
ment of Licenses and Inspections who failed to disclose a variety of improper fi-
nancial arrangements, including referring paying customers to the mother of his
child as a way of avoiding payment of child support. See Antico, 275 F.3d at 261-65
(finding that Antico also entered into variety of other improper financial arrange-
ments). The court concluded that Antico's obligation to disclose his personal in-
terest in the official business he was handling arose by virtue of both state and local
laws. See id. at 263-64 (noting further that "even if we were to read these [statutory]
conflict of interest provisions as restrictively as Antico suggests, we find that his
conduct violated the fiduciary relationship between a public servant charged with
disinterested decision-making and the public he serves"). Further, the court ex-
plained that this fiduciary relationship imposed upon the official a duty "to dis-
close material information affecting an officials impartial decision-making and to
recuse himself . . . regardless of a state or local law." See id. (finding that Antico's
intentional concealment of his conflict of interest violated both state and local law,
as well as his fiduciary duty to general public). The court also concluded there was
sufficient evidence to uphold Antico's conviction for honest services. See id.
In Panarella, the defendant was an owner of a tax collecting business who was
charged with being an accessory after the fact to a state senator's commission of
honest services fraud. See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 679-81 (discussing state senator's
fraud and tax evasion). Panarella did not dispute that the senator concealed a
financial interest in his business contrary to Pennsylvania's disclosure statute,
which criminalized such conduct, but rather, disputed that in the absence of an
allegation that the senator misused his office for personal gain, the superseding
information failed to state an offense. See id. at 691-92. The court held that "where
a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly bene-
fit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal
law, that official has deprived the public of his honest services under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346." Id. at 691 (reasoning that determination of whether public official had
misused his office for personal gain was ambiguous standard). The court further
determined that the violation of Pennsylvania's disclosure statute served as a "bet-
ter limiting principle for purposes of determining when an official's failure to dis-
close a conflict of interest amounts to honest services fraud." Id. (citing breaches
of duty in failure to disclose). The state statute at issue in Panarella provided clear
notice for purposes of the rule of lenity that nondisclosure of the official's conflict
of interest was criminal. See id. at 693. In addition, the court continued, the intru-
sion into state autonomy was significantly muted, because the conduct that
amounted to honest services fraud was conduct the state itself had chosen to
criminalize. See id. at 694. The court's holding had a "sound basis in both doctrine
and policy," as the official's conduct fell "squarely within the classical definition of
fraud," which in its "elementary common law sense of deceit ... includes the delib-
erate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation." Id.
at 695 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Murphy, the defendant was neither a publicly-elected or publicly-employed
official; rather, he served as chairman of a county political party. See Murphy, 323
F.3d at 10 (reversing defendant's conviction for honest services fraud because gov-
CASEBRIEF 10192010]
13
Hines: Should Using Facebook at Work be a Federal Crime: The Third Circu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
by public officials, not by private individuals.8 8 Thus, the Third Circuit
was first presented with the issue of whether to apply honest services fraud
to private fiduciaries in McGeehan.89 While the Third Circuit declined to
adopt either the materiality or the foreseeable harm standard, the court
articulated how both standards should be applied within the Third
Circuit.9 0
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S PRE-SKILLING INTERPRETATION
OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
A. Factual Background and Procedural Posture of McGeehan
Between September 1994 and July 1998, Lawrence McGeehan served
as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Ben Franklin Technol-
ogy Center (BFTC).9 1 During this same time, Kathleen Haluska acted as
the Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer of BFTC.9 2 BFTC was a
publicly funded, non-profit corporation based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
and its mission was to encourage the development and commercialization
of new technology.9 3 BFTC received funding from the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania upon the condition that it would spend such funds only for
approved purposes, including any grants and administrative expenses that
conformed to the mission of the organization. 94 In 1995, BFTC entered
into an agreement with the United States Navy to administer a project in
ernment failed to identify any "clearly established fiduciary relationship or legal
duty in either federal or state law between Murphy and Passaic County or its citi-
zens"). Furthermore, the court looked to state law to ascertain what standards of
fiduciary care the public officials were required to meet in order to determine
whether the officials defrauded the citizens of their right to honest services. See id.
at 115 (noting that in Antico and Panarella, court assumed, based on extensive pre-
McNally case law, that public officials have duty to provide honest services to pub-
lic). In other words, collateral state laws established what type of fiduciary duty was
required in those cases and limited the scope of honest services fraud. See id. at
116 (determining that limiting principle was inherently important because "plain
language of § 1346 provides little guidance as to the conduct it prohibits" and
explaining that "the deprivation of honest services is perforce an imprecise stan-
dard" (quoting Panarella, 277 F.3d at 698)). For this reason, the court chose to
endorse the decisions of other courts of appeals that have interpreted Section 1346
more stringently and required a state law limiting principle for honest services
fraud. See id. (concluding that without fiduciary relationship, "it was improper for
the District Court to allow the jury to create one").
88. See McGeehan, 584 F.3d at 564 (distinguishing McGeehan from past cases).
89. See id. (noting that issue of honest services fraud as applied to private fidu-
ciaries was novel issue for court).
90. For a further discussion of the opinion, see infra notes 91-124 and accom-
panying text.
91. See McGeehan, 584 F.3d at 563 (identifying nature of McGeehan's position
at BFTC).
92. See id. (identifying nature of Haluska's position at BFTC).
93. See id. at 562 (discussing development of BFTC and sources of funding).
94. See id. (detailing arrangement between BFTC and Commonwealth). Fur-
ther, any breach of this arrangement could have jeopardized BFTC's state funding.
See id. (setting forth contractual obligations).
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which the Navy provided funding while BFTC administered fund disburse-
ments to subcontractors involved in the research and development of
electro-optics technologies.9 5 Together, McGeehan and Haluska were re-
sponsible for BFTC's daily operations and budget-related issues, including
the agreement with the Navy.9 6
McGeehan and Haluska were indicted and charged with twenty
counts of mail fraud in violation of Sections 1341 and 1346, and two
counts of wire fraud in violation of Sections 1343 and 1346.97 The indict-
ment alleged that McGeehan and Haluska caused BFTC to use its funding
from the Commonwealth and Navy to pay for personal expenses and to
cover other non-business related expenditures." Specifically, the indict-
ment alleged that defendants devised a scheme to defraud BFTC of their
honest services by "misusing its funding, making excessive expenditures
for purposes such as lavish travel and entertainment, subverting its fiscal
controls, improperly withholding information from BFTC's Board of Di-
rectors, and threatening, intimidating, or removing employees who ques-
tioned their misuse of authority."9 9 Both defendants were eventually
sentenced to a thirty-four month term of imprisonment for each count, to
be served concurrently. 100 The defendants appealed, however, claiming
that the specific facts alleged by the prosecution in the indictments did
not constitute honest services fraud.10 1
95. See id. at 563 (explaining that project was named National Network for
Electro-Optics Manufacturing Technology (NNEOMT)). The project agreement
provided that any funds the Navy provided were to be used solely for the purpose
of administering the project. See id. (describing specifics of agreement).
96. See id. (acknowledging responsibilities of NNEOMT).
97. See id. (alleging seven additional counts of fraud against United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1031).
98. See id. (discussing defendants' indictment).
99. Id. (internal citations omitted) (discussing counts one through nine of
indictment). Counts ten through twenty-two of the indictment alleged that BYI'C,
under the defendants' management, "owed the United States Navy a duty of hon-
est services pursuant to its contract to administer NNEOMT." See id. at 564 (alleg-
ing that defendants "devised a scheme and artifice to defraud the United States
Navy of the intangible right of honest services"). Counts twenty-three through
twenty-nine alleged that defendants knowingly caused BFTC to execute a scheme
and artifice to defraud and obtain money from the Navy in excess of one million
dollars or more. See id. (alleging that defendants used mail and wire communica-
tions to use NNEOMT funds for unauthorized purposes).
100. See id. (discussing trial process). Both defendants initially pleaded not
guilty, however, during trial, Haluska entered an unconditional guilty plea and
McGeehan proceeded to verdict and was convicted on eight counts. See id. (sen-
tencing both defendants to thirty-four month terms of imprisonment for each
count, to be served concurrently, and imposing three years of supervised release).
101. See id. at 564 (stating that Third Circuit's standard of review is plenary).
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B. The Third Circuit Tackles Honest Services Fraud
as Applied to Private Fiduciaries
The Third Circuit began its analysis in McGeehan by providing an over-
view of the current legal landscape of honest services fraud.102 After dis-
cussing its past cases involving public officials, the court acknowledged
that McGeehan presented a new issue: whether the honest services fraud
statute can be applied to private conduct. 0 3 The court then discussed
honest services fraud allegations as they applied to each victim-BFTC
and the Navy. 104
1. BFTC Counts: Breach of Fiduciary Duty
First, the court found that the indictment allegations sufficiently
demonstrated that the defendants owed a fiduciary duty to BFTC by virtue
of their status as corporate officers.105 Second, the court concluded that
the alleged intentional violation of this duty, as set forth in the indictment,
was sufficient to serve as the basis for an honest services fraud charge with-
out "offending principles of fair notice or threatening to convert mere
breaches of contract into federal crimes." 0 6 In so doing, the court dis-
missed the defendants' argument that honest services fraud typically only
covers bribery and failure to disclose a conflict of interest resulting in per-
sonal gain. 0 7 The court affirmatively held that "a collateral fiduciary duty
can provide the source of the honest services owed under Sections 1341,
1343, and 1346."108 Consequently, the breach of a duty can serve as the
basis of a "deprivation of the intangible right of honest services" claim. 10 9
In assessing the honest services claim at issue, the court considered
whether to adopt the foreseeable harm standard or the materiality stan-
dard.11 0 Here, it suggested the importance of establishing a standard that
102. See id. at 565 (discussing statute, rulings by Supreme Court, response by
Congress, and interpretation by Third Circuit as applied to public fiduciaries). For
a detailed discussion of the history of honest services fraud, see supra notes 27-56
and accompanying text.
103. See McGeehan, 584 F.3d at 569 (finding that case law supports conclusion
that private actors can owe "honest services" under Section 1346).
104. See id. (developing both standards although declining to specify which to
adopt).
105. See id. at 570 (finding that defendants were obligated to disclose any per-
sonal interests in matters over which they had decision-making power).
106. See id. (holding that indictment made out necessary elements of honest
services fraud and district court did not err by denying motion to dismiss these
counts).
107. See id. at 571 (finding that appellants' acts of diverting corporate funds to
finance their own personal expenditures were self-serving and thus could be cov-
ered under conflict of interest standard).
108. Id. (finding collateral fiduciary duty in McGeehan and Haluska's duties
to BFTC).
109. Id. (internal citations omitted).
110. See id. at 572 (discussing important aspects of both standards).
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would "avoid the over-criminalization of private relationships."11 1 The
court first evaluated the foreseeable harm standard of the Sixth Circuit,
stating that rather than showing that the defendant actually intended to
inflict economic harm on the victim, the prosecution need only prove
"that the defendant intended to breach his fiduciary duty, and reasonably
should have foreseen that the breach would create an identifiable eco-
nomic risk to the victim."112 It then contrasted this standard with the Sec-
ond Circuit's materiality standard, and concluded that some circuits favor
the latter because a material misrepresentation is a fundamental principle
in the law of fraud.' 1 3 Under this materiality standard, the "misrepresen-
tation or omission at issue for an honest services fraud conviction must be
material, such that the information or omission would naturally tend to
lead or is capable of leading a reasonable employer to change its
conduct."1 14
The Third Circuit declined to expressly adopt one standard over the
other, finding that it need not decide which requirement is appropriate
because the conduct alleged in the indictment "clearly satisfies both stan-
dards." 15 Specifically, the court determined that because the defendants
intentionally and deceptively misappropriated BFTC's funding for their
own personal expenditures, it was reasonably foreseeable that this breach
of fiduciary duty would cause economic harm to BFTC.1 1 6 Furthermore,
this breach of fiduciary duty was also material because a corporation
would have altered its conduct to prevent the misuse.' 1 7 Thus, McGeehan
and Haluska's breach of fiduciary duty met both standards.1 1 s
2. The Navy Counts: Breach of Contractual Duty
The remaining counts in the indictment alleged that McGeehan and
Haluska's conduct caused BFTC to breach its contractual obligation to an-
111. See id. (suggesting that other courts of appeals have added additional
requirements to safeguard against over-criminalization).
112. See id. at 571 (discussing Sixth Circuit's Frost jurisprudence requiring
prosecution to demonstrate that defendant "foresaw or reasonably should have
foreseen that [the entity to whom the fiduciary duty is owed] might suffer an eco-
nomic harm as a result of the breach").
113. See id. (citing Rybickifor proposition that "the non-de minimis reasonably
foreseeable harm test . . . limits the scope" of Section 1346 (internal citations
omitted)).
114. See id. (internal citations omitted) (finding that victim's knowledge of
scheme would tend to cause victim to change his or her behavior).
115. See id. (finding that McGeehan and Haluska were guilty under either
test).
116. See id. (discussing McGeehan and Haluska's conduct).
117. See id. (contemplating BFTC's potential corrective action).
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other business entity-the Navy.119 Unlike the BFTC counts, the Navy
counts did not involve services owed pursuant to a recognized fiduciary
relationship.12 0 Here, the court found that the government must "allege
more than the breach of non-fiduciary contractual duties in order to
charge a private individual with honest services fraud."12 1
The court then required that there be a fiduciary duty as an element
of honest services fraud. 122 The court further noted, however, that the
duty of "good faith and fair dealing" inherent in a contract does not serve
to impose a fiduciary duty on BFTC.123 Thus, the Third Circuit vacated
the convictions of McGeehan and Haluska pertaining to the counts alleg-
ing that they breached their duty of honest services to the Navy.124
IV. THE SUPREME COURT REIGNS IN HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
In light of the lower courts' conflicting interpretations of honest ser-
vices fraud, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in three separate cases involving this issue during its 2010 term. 125 Justice
Scalia's dissent from denial of certiorari in Sorich v. United States1 2 6 paved
the way for the Court's review of United States v. Weyhrauch,12 7 United States
v. Black,12 8 and Skilling1 2 9 In June of 2010, the Supreme Court dealt pros-
ecutors a blow by narrowing the scope of honest services fraud in
Skilling. 3 0
With Skilling, the Court held that "honest-services fraud does not en-
compass conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes
and kickbacks."' 3 1 Thus, defendants accused of violating Section 1346
119. See McGeehan, 584 F.3d at 569 (finding that these counts advanced theory
of honest services fraud that was not within core categories of prior Third Circuit
cases).
120. See id. (asserting that these counts involved contractual relationship).
121. Id. (finding government's allegations insufficient).
122. See id. (asserting that existing fiduciary duty is in fact element of offense).
123. See id. (discussing significance of duty that must exist).
124. See id. at 575 (vacating and remanding to district court for further
proceedings).
125. See Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties
Through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 67-68
(2010) (discussing controversy surrounding honest services fraud).
126. See Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with denial of certiorari).
127. The specific question presented in Weyhrauch was "whether a federal
honest services mail fraud prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346 requires
proof that the conduct at issue also violated an applicable state law." United States
v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008).
128. See United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 2379 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-876).
129. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
130. See id. at 2933 (limiting honest services fraud liability to situations in
which perpetrator receives some bribe or kickback).
131. See id. at 2933 (narrowing reach of honest services fraud statute to avoid
problems of unconstitutional vagueness).
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must have received some benefit from the conduct; mere harm resulting
from a breach of fiduciary duty does not suffice.132 The term "kickback"
means any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or
compensation of any kind that is provided, either directly or indirectly, for
the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in
certain situations.1 3 3
The Court also challenged Congress "to speak more clearly than it
has."*3 4 Specifically, if Congress desires to expand the Court's interpreta-
tion of honest services fraud, it must "employ standards of sufficient defi-
niteness and specificity to overcome due process concerns" if it is to "take
up the enterprise of criminalizing 'undisclosed self-dealing by a public of-
ficial or private employee.' "135 The Court hinted that the standard Con-
gress adopts must answer several important questions:
How direct or significant does the conflicting financial interest
have to be? To what extent does the official action have to fur-
ther that interest in order to amount to fraud? To whom should
the disclosure be made and what information should it
convey?' 36
If McNally provides any hint as to the future of honest services fraud,
Congress may attempt to overrule the Court by reenacting prior case law
through legislation.' 37 In fact, Congress is currently considering a bill to
restore honest services fraud to its pre-Skilling status.13 8 While the future
of honest services fraud legislation remains unclear, Congress could very
well adopt one of the two competing honest services fraud standards uti-
lized by the circuit courts.' 3 9 The Third Circuit discussed both of these
standards in United States v. McGeehan.140 Accordingly, McGeehan provides
both prosecutors and defense attorneys with valuable insight for future
prosecutions, presuming that Congress will rise to the Supreme Court's
challenge and articulate a clearer standard.
132. See id. at 2931 ("To preserve the statute without transgressing constitu-
tional limitations, we now hold that [Section 1346] criminalizes only the bribe-and-
kickback core of the pre-McNally case law.").
133. See id. at 2933-34 (discussing types of personal benefits that must accrue
to perpetrator of honest services fraud).
134. See id. at 2933 (limiting honest services fraud liability to "only seriously
culpable conduct").
135. Id. at 2933 n.44 (requiring greater degree of specificity from Congress
before expanding criminal prohibitions of honest services fraud).
136. Id.
137. See Peter J. Henning, How the Skilling Ruling Reins In White-Collar Cases,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 2010, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
06/25/how-the-skilling-ruling-reins-in-white-collar-cases/.
138. See Rubenfeld, supra note 20.
139. See id. (hypothesizing that how Congress might address issue is "very
much an open question").
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IV. GUIDANCE FOR THIRD CIRCUIT PRACTITIONERS IN LIGHT
OF McGEEHAN AND SKILLING
Although a great deal of controversy continues to surround the use of
honest services fraud to criminalize private conduct, McGeehan provides
meaningful future guidance for attorneys practicing in the Third Circuit
when Congress answers the Supreme Court's challenge to more clearly
define the contours of the honest services fraud statute."'' Both defense
counsel and prosecutors alike can gain valuable insight from McGeehan.142
Recall the Facebook hypothetical presented in the introduction. 143
Kevin, an employee at Dunder Mifflin, accessed Facebook at work despite
his employer's policy prohibiting the use of work computers to access so-
cial utility websites.144 Assume Kevin is indicted for wire fraud for depriv-
ing his employer of its right to his honest services in violation of an
amended Section 1346 that adopts the pre-Skilling interpretation of honest
services fraud.1" 5 Until Congress passes a more expansive honest services
fraud statute, Kevin will not be guilty of any crime because he has not
committed a kickback or bribe under Skilling.146 In analyzing this hypo-
thetical or any case where a private individual is indicted for honest ser-
vices fraud, however, the following guidelines-extracted from McGeehan
and other Third Circuit cases-may prove helpful after Congress acts.147
A. Practical Guidelines for Defense Counsel
As a preliminary matter, defense counsel needs to examine the rela-
tionship between the defendant and the victim.14 8 The classification of
this relationship is critical in determining what duty the defendant owes to
the victim."' 9 In our hypothetical, Kevin is in an employee-employer rela-
tionship with Dunder Mifflin. 5 0o Defense counsel must attempt to charac-
terize the relationship as merely contractual in nature.' 5 ' As the Third
141. For a further discussion of how practitioners should interpret McGeehan,
see infra notes 148-89 and accompanying text.
142. See id. (discussing practical value of opinion).
143. For a discussion of the Kevin hypothetical, see supra notes 1-4 and ac-
companying text.
144. See id. (discussing Kevin's employment status).
145. See id. (discussing hypothetical indictment for accessing Facebook in vio-
lation of employee handbook policies).
146. For a discussion of the bribe and kickback limitation in Skilling, see supra
notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
147. For a further discussion of the guidelines, see supra notes 141-89 and
accompanying text.
148. See United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (con-
firming that first issue to be explored is scope of "honest services" owed).
149. See id. (explaining that relationship between parties is often defined by
extent of duty owed to one another).
150. For a discussion of the Kevin hypothetical, see supra notes 1-4 and ac-
companying text.
151. See McGeehan, 584 F.3d at 569 (finding that merely contractual relation-
ships are not included in statute).
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Circuit established in McGeehan, the government must allege more than
the breach of "non-fiduciary contractual duties" in an indictment.'
5 2 Per
McGeehan, allegations of a breach of "good faith and fair dealing" inherent
in a contract are not enough.15 3 Thus, defense counsel must characterize
the Kevin/Dunder Mifflin relationship as purely contractual and assert
that Kevin does not stand in a fiduciary relationship with the victim.'
5 4
Defense counsel should attempt to show that the defendant-victim rela-
tionship is akin to the BFTC-Navy relationship the Third Circuit deter-
mined was not subject to honest services fraud in McGeehan.155 In any
employee-employer relationship, defense counsel will have a difficult time
persuading the court that an employee, like Kevin, does not owe a fiduci-
ary duty to the employer, particularly when the rules and policies are de-
tailed in an employee handbook.156
Second, defense counsel should encourage the court to firmly adopt
the foreseeable harm standard over the materiality standard.'
5 7 Many
commentators argue that the materiality standard sets too low a bar to
prosecution for honest services fraud for private fiduciaries because it re-
quires little or no actual harm to the company.' 5 8 The materiality stan-
dard captures some behavior that the reasonably foreseeable standard
does not, including economic harm that is completely unforeseeable or
harm that is not economic in nature, such as reputational harm.
1 59
Therefore, defense counsel should urge the court to adopt the foreseeable
harm standard because it focuses on actual harm and damage to the vic-
tim, making it a more accurate test.160
Under the materiality standard, Kevin is guilty as charged.161 No em-
ployer would knowingly allow Kevin to spend an hour on Facebook each
day instead of working, even if the employer is Dunder Mifflin.1
62 Assum-
ing Kevin accesses Facebook at work forty-eight weeks per year, and five
152. See id. (finding that government must allege more in indictment).
153. See id. at 574 n.12 (discussing duty that must exist).
154. See id. (showing that fiduciary relationship furthers honest services fraud
analysis).
155. See id. (finding that mere contractual obligations were not enough for
indictment).
156. For a discussion of other hypothetical scenarios involving employee
handbooks that fall victim to the honest services fraud statute, see supra note 5.
157. For a discussion of the differences between the two standards, see supra
notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
158. See Stephens, supra note 27, at 80 (discussing practical differences be-
tween two standards).
159. See id. at 92-96 (arguing that prosecution has better chance of gaining
conviction under materiality standard rather than foreseeable harm standard).
160. See id. at 87-92 (stating that foreseeable harm standard is more difficult
standard for prosecution to satisfy).
161. For a discussion of the materiality standard, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
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days per week, he has effectively deprived his employer of 240 quality
hours of work.163 Thus, Kevin's conduct easily meets the materiality
standard.16 4
Under the foreseeable harm standard, in contrast, Kevin has a better
argument for acquittal.16 5 Kevin, who knowingly violated Dunder Mif-
flin's policy regarding social utility networks, may not reasonably foresee
that by spending an hour each day for non-work purposes, he is breaching
a duty of loyalty to the company and causing harm.166 Perhaps Kevin be-
lieves that Facebook refreshes his focus on his work throughout the day
and that he makes up for the lost hour in his spectacular productivity.16 7
Thus, Kevin has a better argument under this standard.16 8
Third, and perhaps most importantly, defense counsel must urge the
court to exercise extreme caution so as to not over-criminalize behav-
ior. 169 There must be a limit at which the law can punish behavior, lest we
live in an overregulated society.170 This is Kevin's best argument.171
Counsel should assert that because Congress has not articulated a clear
standard, Section 1346 regulates the conduct of public officials rather
than private individuals like Kevin.17 2 Inherent in the role of a public
official is the duty to make decisions based on the best interest of his or
her constituents.]7 3 Citizens elect public officials, and when officials act
corruptly, they violate a natural political contract.' 7 4 In the private sector,
163. See id. (basing calculation on assumption of four weeks of vacation dur-
ing year).
164. For a discussion of how the materiality standard is the easier standard to
meet, see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the foreseeable harm standard, see supra notes 67-80
and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the underlying Kevin hypothetical, see supra notes 1-4
and accompanying text.
167. See id.
168. For a discussion of why the foreseeable harm standard is a more difficult
standard for the prosecution to meet than the materiality standard, see supra note
84 and accompanying text.
169. See Tendler, supra note 42, at 2740 (noting that statutory language codi-
fying honest services doctrine potentially permits prosecutors to apply honest ser-
vices fraud statute quite broadly). Over-criminalization refers to the excessive
reliance on a criminal sanction, especially with malum prohibitum types of crimes.
See id. at 2761 n.243, 2762 (arguing that because malum prohibitum crimes such as
honest services fraud are not necessarily immoral, over-criminalization of such
crimes may lead to excessively intrusive regulation of private behavior).
170. See id. at 2762 (finding that over-criminalization can lead to increased
disrespect for law, discriminatory enforcement, and waste of judicial resources).
171. See id. at 2762-63 (arguing that indefinite criminal statutes such as honest
services fraud should be applied sparingly lest they no longer provide constitution-
ally required notice to potential wrongdoers of criminality of their actions).
172. See id. at 2741-42 (arguing for justification of scenario as applied to pub-
lic officials because their inherent job description is to serve for good of public).
173. See Tendler, supra note 42, at 2741-42 (showing that politicians form nat-
ural contract with constituency).
174. See id. (supporting honest services fraud as applied to public individuals).
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however, such a strict duty of loyalty is not found in ordinary private rela-
tionships and cannot be inferred from a strict reading of the statute.17 5
Even if an employee handbook sets clear rules, defense counsel should
argue that the statute is sufficiently vague such that it fails to inform Kevin
that his conduct is a federal crime.' 7 6 Further, defense counsel can argue
that the principals of separation of powers and federalism mandate that
the breadth and scope of the statute is limited.177 After all, do we really
want to punish people like Kevin when there are "100 million workers in
the United States" acting similarly?178
B. Practical Guidelines for Prosecutors
First, the prosecution must characterize the relationship between de-
fendant and victim as one that is fiduciary in nature such that the defen-
dant owed a clear duty to the victim.' 7 9 The Third Circuit has specifically
held that a breach of this fiduciary duty is sufficient to serve as the basis of
an honest services fraud charge without "offending principles of fair no-
tice or threatening to convert mere breaches of contract into federal
crimes." 80 To prove successful, the prosecution must succeed in analogiz-
ing this relationship to the BFTC-McGeehan relationship that involved an
inherent fiduciary duty, rather than to the BFTC-Navy relationship that
was characterized as purely contractual in McGeehan.18 In the employee-
employer context, the prosecution will easily satisfy this burden by show-
ing that Kevin owes the prototypical fiduciary duty of loyalty to Dunder
Mifflin. 18 2
Second, the prosecution should encourage the court to adopt the ma-
teriality standard.' 8 3 Under the materiality standard, the prosecution can
successfully convict a defendant who may cause unforeseeable harm to a
175. See id. at 2742 (finding that even when they do exist, nature and fiduciary
duty of loyalty in private sector differs in kind from public sector obligation and
that this distinction bears heavily on problem of fair notice).
176. For a discussion of vagueness concerns, see supra notes 15-17 and accom-
panying text.
177. See id. (discussing plethora of constitutional issues inherent in vagueness
of statute).
178. See Chafetz, supra note 9 (arguing against constitutionality of honest ser-
vices fraud).
179. See United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding
that merely contractual relationships are not included in statute).
180. See id. at 569, 71 (finding that case law supports conclusion that "private
actors can owe 'honest services' under Section 1346").
181. See id. at 574 n.12 (showing that outcome of McGeehan stems from classifi-
cation of relationship between parties).
182. For a discussion of the underlying Kevin hypothetical, see supra notes 14
and accompanying text.
183. For a discussion of why the materiality standard is the easier standard to
meet, see supra note 84.
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company, so long as that harm is material. 18 4 Under this standard, the
prosecution need only show that Kevin's conduct, if discovered by Dunder
Miffin, would have led the company to change its conduct to correct the
behavior.' 8 5
Third, prosecutors should maintain that Section 1346 is an important
and relevant statute because it is practically flexible in application and
serves as a tool for prosecutors to punish conduct that cannot readily be
charged under other statutes.' 8 6 In this vein, Section 1346 serves as a
"stopgap device" to deal on a temporary basis with new phenomenon "un-
til particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly
with the evil."1 8 7 In Kevin's case, however, the prosecution would have an
exceedingly difficult time persuading a judge to allow the indictment be-
cause Kevin is merely an employee accessing Facebook at work, not a crim-
inal mastermind.' 88 In an ideal world, no prosecutor would bring this
charge; however, according to McGeehan, there is nothing that prevents a
prosecutor from doing so.' 8 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Honest services fraud has been, and will continue to be, an extremely
controversial law.' 90 As evidenced by the Supreme Court's challenge to
Congress to articulate a clearer standard in Skilling, honest services fraud
remains unsettled law. McGeehan sets out clear hurdles that prosecutors
and defense attorneys will face under either standard, if adopted by Con-
gress, when practicing before the Third Circuit.' 91 Practitioners must
carefully define the duty owed between the defendant and victim, advo-
cate for either the materiality or foreseeability standard to best serve their
clients' interests, and carefully place arguments within the broader themes
of federalism, separation of powers, and vagueness.192 Nonetheless, until
184. For a discussion of the materiality standard, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the materiality standard, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
186. See Tendler, supra note 42, at 2740 (discussing congressional policy con-
cerns behind enactment of Section 1346).
187. See id. at 2761-62 (finding that this malleability releases federal prosecu-
tors from often technical jurisdictional requirements found in other federal fraud
statutes).
188. For a discussion of the underlying Kevin hypothetical, see supra notes 1-4
and accompanying text.
189. See United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 2009) (al-
lowing prosecution of private conduct along parallel circumstances as Kevin
Facebook hypothetical discussed above).
190. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding honest services fraud,
see supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
191. See McGeehan, 584 F.3d at 569 (giving sufficient analysis of both
standards).
192. For a discussion of prosecutorial and defense strategies, see supra notes
141-89 and accompanying text.
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the Third Circuit revisits this issue, private fiduciaries must carefully con-
sider their conduct and not deprive others of their intangible right to hon-
est services.193 While the law has been used to indict significant breaches
of duty, like McGeehan, resulting in substantial economic loss, prosecutors
continue to push the limits of this law as applied to other private con-
duct. 9 4 Thus, employees should avoid status updates, wall posts, and pic-
ture tags while at work because, unless Congress is willing to accept the
Supreme Court's limiting principle, something as simple as accessing
Facebook could result in an unsuspecting employee receiving a federal
criminal sentence.
Derek Hines
193. For a further discussion of the consequences of violating the honest ser-
vices fraud statute, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
194. For a further discussion of how the Kevin hypothetical illustrates a possi-
ble abuse of this law, see supra notes 141-89 and accompanying text.
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